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reported on taxable returns, paid on the average 89 per cent of the
annual amounts of income taxes attributable to interest. This extreme
relationship was moderated after 1940, partly because of a change in
the distribution of reported interest income in favor of the lower income
groups and partly because of the relatively greater increases of effective
tax rates on smaller than larger incomes. Between 1941 and 1949 in-
clusive, taxpayers with incomes of $10,000ormore reported an annual
average of 41 per cent of all the interest on taxable returns and paid
an annual average of 71 per cent of the income taxes attributable to
interest.
2. Taxes on interest income declined radically as a share of total income
taxes, but absorbed one-sixth or more of all interest reported on taxable
returns in most years since 1942.
As a proportion of total personal income tax liability, the amount
contributed by interest income ranged during the twenties from 11.2
to 8.1 per cent (Table 20). The proportion rose to 15.8 per cent between
1929 and 1932, when other components of income shrank more dras.-
tically during the economic collapse of that period. Thereafter a sharp
fall took place that continued with unimportant interruptions for the
next twelve years. In 1950, income tax liability attributable to interest
accounted for only 1.6 per cent of total personal income tax liability.
Income taxes absorbed a relatively small proportion of total interest
income reported on taxable returns during the two decades 1921—1940,
the proportion varying between 3.1 and 7.3 per cent (Table 21). It
rose sharply in the years following 1940, climbing to 11.0 per cent in
1941, 17.2 in 1942, 21.2 in 1943, 22.9 in 1944, and 23.6 in 1945, after
which it gradually declined to 15.9 per cent in 1949 and then rose to
17.8 per cent in 1950.
IV. INTEREST INCOME AND INTEREST RAPES AFTER TAXES
For the upper income groups, of course, the proportion of interest
income absorbed by income taxes rose to much higher levels during the
1940's, and the marginal rates rose higher still. The effective federal
tax rates on the first dollar of additional interest or other ordinary in-
come for a married man with two dependent children and the cited
amounts of statutory net income from other sources for the years
1940—1954 are shown in Table 22. To these, in states imposing their
own income taxes, should be added the marginal tax rates under the
state laws.1294 AMERICANSTATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
TABLE 20
TAX LIABILITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO INTEREST AS A PER-
CENTAGE OF TOTAL TAX LIABILITY, BY
INCOME GROUPS, 1918-1950
(Percentages)

















1922 4.4 7.5 7.110.112.713.112.611,49.5 11.2
19237.7 9.8 9.210.312.112.311.711.09.2 11.0
1924 7.6 9.9 9.89.012.012.011.310.28.7 10.6
1925 7.6 9.6 9.7 8.911.310.8 9.5 7.35.7 8.5
1926 7.4 9.910.49.712.712.110.78.2 5.6 9.3
1927 7.0 9.510.210.613.312.510.78.05.5 9.2
1928 8.811.410.710.112.611.79.8 7.0 5.4 8.1
1929 7.7 10.510.510.213.112.610.77.7 6.1 8.6
1930 8.0 12.511.112.318.117.315.011.3 7.5 12.9
1931 7.8 12.110.813.020.218.817.211.3 7.9 14.3
1932 8.0 10.88.813.520.326.320.812.8 6.6 15.8
1933 8.7 11.3 8.511.615.417.714.310.3 5.3 12.1
1934 6.1 9.2 6.710.213.012.3 9.9 6.8 4.3 9.2
1935 4.9 7.1 5.6 8.510.810.5 8.7 5.8 3.1 7.7
1936 5.6 7.1 5.2 5.26.2 6.3 5.9 4.8 4.1 5.4
19374.4 5.8 4.2 4.0 6.16.2 5.8 4.9 4.8 4.5





1943 0.8 0.40.72.1 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.1 2.8 1.6
19440.60.40.51.72.73.03.23.55.41.5
1945 0.6 0.40.5 1.62.42.8 2.9 3.2 4.7 1.5
1946 0.7 0.40.5 1.52.3 2.7 3.0 3.6 4.3 1.6
1947 0.7 0.40.4 1.32.2 2.7 3.0 3.6 4.1 1.5
1948 0.6 0.40.40.9 2.0 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.5 1.4
1949 0.9 0.50.5 1.12.3 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.7 1.6
1950 0.8 0.50.40.9 2.3 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 1.6
BIn1944 changes to Adjusted Gross Income Classes.INTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1295
TABLE21
PROPORTION OF INTEREST INCOME ABSORBED BY
INCOME TAX, TAXABLE RETURNS, 1918-1950
Percentage of Percentage of
interest income interest income
absoEbed by absorbed by
income tax income tax
1918 11.3 1935 0.2
1919 9.7 1936 7.3
1920 7.0 1937 7.0
1921 6.1 1938 5.4
1922 6.7 1939 6.0
1923 3.9 1940 7.2
1924 3.7 1941 11.0
1925 3.8 1942 17.2
1926 3.9 1943 21.2
1927 4.2 1944 22.9
1928 4.6 1945 23.6
1929 4.3 1946 21.6
1930 3.6 1947 21.3
1931 3.1 1948 17.3
1932 5.1 1949 15.9
1933 5.3 1950 17.8
1934 5.8
1.Did low interest rates and high tax rates deter fixed-interest investment?
The pronounced increase in personal income tax rates in the 1940's
took place after interest rates had declined markedly for most of a
decade and were still falling. In consequence the after-tax or "take-
home" yields obtainable by individuals from fixed-interest investment
suffered a sharp compound reduction. In 1929 a married man with two
dependent children could obtain a marginal after-tax yield of 4.71 per
cent from a moderate investment in the average of Moody's Aaa
corporate bonds if his statutory net income from other sources was
$5,000, a "take-home" yield of 4.21 per cent, if $25,000, and one of
3.93 per cent, if $50,000. By 1950 these after-tax yields had shrunk to
2.16, 1.71, and 1.21, respectively. Similar radical reductions in after-tax1296 AMERICANSTATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
TABLE 22
MARGINAL TAX RATES ON THE FIRST DOLLAR OF ADDITIONAL
INTEREST OR OTHER ORDINARY INCOME, 1940-1954
(Married, with Two Dependent Children)
Statutory net income(thousandsof dollars)















































































bRatesare for joint return.
°IncludesVictory Tax.
dTakinginto account the statutory limitation of the maximum effective rate to 90 per cent.
For the years 1946—1954 varying maximum effective rates were imposed on the whole of net income
that had the effect of reducing the marginal rates applicable to additional income in the uppermost
income brackets. The levels of net income, for each year, at which the maximum effective rates became
operative and the resulting effective rates were as follows:








yieldsoccurred in bonds of lower quality. The shrinkage was even
greater at higher levels of income (Tables 23 and 24, Charts 6 and 7).
Nevertheless, individual investors as a whole added very much
larger amounts to their holdings of fixed-interest securities during the
1940's than in any previous decade. They expanded their ownership
of federal securities from $10.1 billion at the end of 1939 to $66.3
billion at the end of 1950.22 This increase was some $14 bfflion greater
than the entire net federal debt outstanding at the end of 1939, about
$12 billion greater than the entire amount of net long-term corporate
debt outstanding on that date, and some $3 billion greater than the
Treasury BuUetin, March 1955, p. 27.INTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1297
TABLE 23
MARGINAL AFTER-TAX YIELDS OF
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TABLE 24
MARGINAL AFTER-TAX YIELDS OF





(Married, with Two Dependent Children)
Year
Selected net incomes Moody's
Baa*
$5,000$10,000$25,000$50,000$100,000
1919 7.25 6.89 6.38 5.87 4.93 2.90
1920 8.20 7.79 7.22 6.64 5.58 3.28
1921 8.35 7.93 7.35 6.76 5.68 3.34
1922 7.08 6.80 6.37 5.81 4.89 3.12
1923 7.24 7.02 6.70 6.26 5.55 4.20
1024 6.83 6.69 6.49 5.94 5.19 3.89
1925 6.27 6.18 6.02 5.52 5.14 4.70
1926 5.87 5.78 5.64 5.17 4.81 4.40
1927 5.48 5.40 5.26 4.82 4.49 4.11
1928 5.48 5.40 5.26 4.82 4.49 4.11
1929 5.90 5.87 5.72 5.25 4.90 4.48
1930 5.90 5.81 5.66 5.19 4.84 4.42
1931 7.62 7.51 7.32 6.71 6.25 5.72
1932 0.30 8.93 8.37 7.63 6.42 4.09
1933 7.76 7.45. 6.98 6.36 5.35 3.41
1934 6.32 6.07 5.75 5.12 4.36 2.91
1935 5.75 5.52 5.23 4.66 3.97 2.64
1936 4.77 4.58 4.34 3.86 3.29 1.96
1937 5.03 4.83 4.58 4.07 3.47 2.06
1938 5.80 5.57 5.28 4.70 4.00 2.38
1939 4.96 4.76 4.51 4.02 3.42 2.03
1940 4.75 4.54 4.23 3.13 2.45 1.62
1941 4.33 3.77 3.42 2.25 1.78 1.30
1942 4.28 3.34 2.82 1.80 1.33 0.73
1943 3.91 2.94 2.47 1.53 1.10 0.47
1944 3.61 2.71 2.24 1.37 0.90 0.36
1945 3.29 2.47 2.07 1.25 0.82 0.33
1946 3.05 2.41 2.06 1.34 0.96 0.53
1947 3.24 2.56 2.19 1.42 1.06 0.56
1948 3.47 2.89 2.80 2.31 1.67 1.27
1949 3.42 2.85 2.76 2.28 1.65 1.25
1950 3.24 2.68 2.59 2.12 1.50 1.12
1951 3.41 2.71 2.65 2.08 1.36 0.92
1952 3.52 2.74 2.65 2.04 1.20 0.88
1953 3.73 2.00 2.81 2.16 1.27 0.93
1954 3.51 2.81 2.74 2.18 1.44 0.98
* See Table7.INTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1299
CHART 6
MARKET YIELDS OF MOODY'S Aaa CORPORATE BONDS
COMPARED WITH THEIR MARGINAL AFTER-TAX YIELDS













(married, with two dependent children)
sum of all farm, residential, and commercial mortagge debt and state
and local government securities then outstanding.23 It would seem
that, in the whole complex of forces operating upon the disposition
of individuals to invest in fixed-interest securities in this period, the
deterrent influence of sharply reduced take-home yields was less im-
portant than the sum of the other forces.
The "other" forces included the exceptional ones arising out of World
War II. Between mid-1939 and mid-1946, the total amount of adjusted
demand deposits and currency in circulation (outside of banks) more
SurvetjofCurrent .flusinees, October 1950, pp.10—15
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CHART 7
MARKET YIELDS OF MOODY'S Baa CORPORATE BONDS
COMPARED WITH THEIR MARGINAL AFTER-TAX YIELDS
TO INDIVIDUALS WITH SELECTED NET INCOMES,
1919—1954
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than tripled.24 Extensive government restrictions were imposed upon
business and consumer spending and upon prices. The result was that
investors not only had powerful patriotic motives and swollen financial
resources to invest heavily in United States government securities during
the war; they had only limited opportunities in the aggregate to spend
or invest otherwise.
We may note that in the case of United States savings bonds, which
accounted for the bulk of individuals' direct investments in fixed-
interest securities, the deterrent influence of the combination of high
income tax rates and relatively low interest rates was, weakened by the
option given holders to postpone tax liability for the accruing interest
until redemption. Further, the seeming disposition and ability of some
taxpayers to avoid reporting this and other kinds of interest receipts
further tended to reduce the restrictive effect, however great or little
it would otherwise have been, of the higher tax rates and lower interest
rates upon fixed-interest investment.
In contrast, despite their close conceptual and competitive relation-.
ship to interest rates, the yields obtainable from common stocks be-
haved quite differently. Stock yields moved generally upward between
1936 and 1943, both before and after allowance for personal income
taxes, though with occasional important reverses, while interest rates
were faffing almost uninterruptedly. The average yield of Moody's
list of 125 representative industrial common stocks, which had been
4 per cent in 1929 and about 3.4 per cent in 1934—1936, rose to 6.4
per cent by 1942. After declining in the next four years to 3.8 per cent,
it rose sharply again to reach 6.8 per cent in 1949, whence it declined
to 6.5 and 6.3 in 1950 and 1951, 5.6 in 1952, 5.5 in 1953, and 4.7 in 1954.
Except in 1942—1946, common stocks offered a generally widening
differential in yield over high-grade bonds until after 1950 (Table 25,
Chart 8). The dividend return from Moody's representative industrial
common stock average had been somewhat below the yield
Aaa corporate bonds in 1934 and 1935 and only slightly above i.n 1936.
By 1949 it was well over twice that offered by the bonds, and the ab-
solute difference between the average market yields of the stocks and
bonds had risen to more than four full percentage points.
Although the high level and steeply graduated scale of the personal
income tax tended to narrow this difference after allowance for taxes,
the spread before income tax became sufficiently wide to give common
stocks a substantial advantage in current after-tax yield. A married
man with two dependent children could have obtained a marginal
FederalReserve Bulletin, February 1948, p. 197.1302 AMERICANSTATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
TABLE25
COMPARISON OF MOODY'S Aaa CORPORATE BOND YIELDS WITH
DIVIDEND YIELDS OF MOODY'S 125 REPRESENTATIVE






over bond yield Aaa bonds
1929 4.Oa 4.7 —0.7
1930 4.9 4.6 0.3
1931 6.4 4.6 1.8
1932 7.3 5.0 2.3
1933 3.7 4.5 —0.8
1934 3.4 4.0 —0.6
1935 3.5 3.6 —0.1
1936 3.4 3.2 0.2
1937 4.8 3.3 1.5
1938 3.9 3.2 0.7
1939 3.9 3.0 0.9
1940 5.3 2.8 2.5
1941 6.3 2.8 3.5
1942 6.4 2.8 3.6
1943 4.5 2.7 1.8
1944 4.6 2.7 1.9
1945 4.0 2.6 1.4
1946 3.8 2.5 1.3
1947 5.1 2.6 2.5
1948 5.9 2.8 3.1
1949 6.8 2.7 4.1
1950 6.5 2.6 3.9
1951 6.3 2.9 3.4
1952 5.6 3.0 2.6
1953 5.5 3.2 2.3
1954 4.7 2.9 1.8
aSeven-monthaverage, June-December.
Source: Moody's Investor's Service as reprinted in Survey of Current Business.
after-taxyieldof 5.38 per cent in 1950 from a moderate investment in
Moody's listofrepresentative industrial common stocks if his income
from other sources was $5,000; 4.13 per cent, if $25.000; and 3.01 per
cent, if $50,000. For the same individuals Moody's Aaa corporate
bonds offered after-tax yields of only 2.16, 1.71, and 1.21 per cent
respectively.







COMPARISON OF MOODY'S Aaa BOND YIELDS WITH
DIVIDEND YIELDS OF MOODY'S 125 REPRESENTATIVE





became relatively less attractive to many individuals than competing
kinds of investments, such as common stocks, rental real estate, owner-
occupied houses, life insurance, tax—exempt securities, etc. For many
persons who were heavily dependent upon investment income tomeet
their living expenses or who were for other reasons highly sensitive and
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readiest of the alternatives to fixed-interest securities lay in common
stocks. For some, rental real estate, such as commercial buildings and
apartment houses, provided an attractive alternative because such
properties—in compensation for their lesser marketability, greater
risk, and greater need for personal supervision—commonly offer a higher
direct return than marketable securities, as well as the important added
attraction that a part of the current cash income from them is not
taxable, being offset by an allowance for depreciation—an allowance
which, it is usually hoped, will prove greater than the actual decline
of the market value of the property. Still other persons, less concerned
with current cash income or possessing special information or talent,
were drawn to investments that promised rewards in forms enjoying
lighter taxation, such as capital gains, oil royalties, life insurance, etc.
But the very persistence of generally high and rising stock yields in
the face of much lower and declining bond yields would seem to be con-
clusive evidence that investors as a whole, institutional and individua],
showed a strong preference for bonds as against stocks at any but
substantial yield differentials. We lack reliable figures for individuals'
additions to their holdings of corporate stocks during the 1940's, but
the Securities and Exchange Commission has estimated that their
holdings of corporate stocks, bonds, and other nongovernment securi-
ties as a whole rose by less than $2 billion during the decade.25
One factor that should logically have operated to discourage equity
investment was the tendency of the increases in the level and steepness
of graduation of tax rates to reduce the net yield advantage after taxes
of higher-yielding risky investments over lower-yielding safer ones.
When a taxpayer is subject to a 50 per cent rate on the next increment
of his income (the 1950 bracket rate for a single taxpayer with net in-
come a little over $20,000 and for a married couple filing a joint return
with twice as much), the difference in marginal tax yield between a
speculative stock returning 7 per cent before income tax and a safe
bond yielding 3 per cent is reduced from 4 to 2 percentage points.
In cutting the "take-home" yields toandper cent, respectively
(assuming an addition to income no larger than the width of one tax
bracket), the tax leaves their relative relationship unchanged, but it
nevertheless bears more heavily upon the risky income. A portion of the
latter may be properly regarded as a kind of insurance premium or
reserve required by the investor to cover the losses of capital he is
25 Liquid savingsestimatesof the Securities and Exchange Commission, in National Income Supple-
ment, 1954, Survey of Current Business, Table 6, p. 166.INTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1305
likely to experience in the long run in connection with such investments.
Instead of obtaining a continuing 7 per cent yield before taxes, he may
expect in the long run to average perhaps only 5 per cent. Particularly
in view of the limited deduction allowed for capital losses, it is from the
absolute excess of yield after taxes offered by the risky over the safe se-
curity (and from possible capital gains on other investments) that the
investor can hope to obtain the funds to make good his capital losses,
not from the relative yield advantage. By reducing this absolute margin,
rising or high rates of income tax, particularly if accompanied by severe
limitations on the allowance for capital losses, may logically be ex-
pected to influence investors to favor safer securities or, what amounts
to the same thing, to insist upon compensatory increases in the before-
tax yield differentials offered by risky over safe securities.
To take an extreme illustration, consider an investor subject to a
tax of 90 per cent on his next increment of income. If he choooses a
risky investment with a market yield of 7 per cent over a safe one
yielding 3 per cent, his after-tax yield will continue to betimes as
large on the former as on the latter, but the absolute difference in
after-tax yields will be only 0.4 per cent—a margin that could hardly
provide significant reserves against capital losses.
Another portion of the market yield differential offered by risky
over safe investments may be viewed as the compensation of the ven-
turesome investor for the service of assuming unpopular risks and
uncertainties. Although the supply of this service may also be respon-
sive to the relationship of the yields of risky and safe investments, apart
from their absolute levels, it seems unreasonable to suppose it is not
significantly responsive to the absolute rate of "take-home" compensa-
tion offered for it. To use our previous hypothetical example, a gross
advantage in after-tax yield of less than 0.4 per cent (to allow something
for reserves against possible capital losses) could not reasonably be
expected to attract as much venturesome investment as a bigger ab-
solute differential in yield.
Finally, there is the difficulty of recouping capital losses from or-
dinary income when the latter is taxed at high rates and when only
severely limited offsets are allowed against it for capital losses. If the
risk of loss that presumably inheres in a stock yielding 7 per cent at a
time when good bonds are yielding 3 per cent should materialize, and
the investor sold some or all of his shares for less than he paid for
them, he would need to earn and save considerably more ordinary
income than the amount of his loss to replace the latter, unless he
should be fortunate enough to obtain offsetting capital gains. For1306 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
example, if a married couple filing joint returns in 1950 sustained a long-
term capital loss of $28,000, and this sum was equal to their average
annual income, they would need to increase their incomes by a mini-
mum of nearly $40,000 in the aggregate during the next ten years and
to save the whole increase after income taxes on it to recoup their
capital loss out of ordinary income without reducing their consumption
standards (assuming 1950 tax law, including a capital loss allowance
against ordinary income of $1,000 each year for six years). If their
average annual income approximated $50,000, and this was also the
amount of their capital loss, they would require additional ordinary
income aggregating about $100,000 in the next ten years to recoup their
capital loss in similar fashion. Unless an investor believes he has good
possibilites of offsetting possible capital losses by future capital gains,
the effect of the foregoing kind of calculation is to accentuate in his
mind the importance of safety of principal as against yield.
The fact that relatively high and generally rising stock yields per-
sisted in the face of falling interest rates on high-grade obligations
during the fifteen years ended in 1950 is doubtless attributable in vary-
ing degree to other influences as well as to tax considerations. Never-
theless, it seems reasonable to infer from the prevailing yields that in-
vestors made substantial allowance for the heavy personal income taxes
on dividends and the limited allowance for capital losses in their ap-
praisal of common stocks and were content during this period to accept
a greatly reduced after-tax rate of return, relative to both previous
levels and to current yields on equity investments, for the safety of
high-grade fixed-interest securities.
The foregoing considerations apply most directly to investments
that promise their rewards mainly in the form of more or less regular
incomes. But a considerable proportion of risky investments are ex-
pected to produce much of or all their yield in the form of capital gains,
which may be loosely defined as the profits obtained by selling stocks,
bonds, land, or other property not a part of the seller's stock in trade
for more than they cost him. Such gains are taxed at very much lower
rates than ordinary income in the United States (one-half or less, pro-
vided the property is held more than six months) and most other coun-
ties, and are completely exempted from income tax in some of them.2°
In consequence, risky investments promising much of their return in
this form offer investors the possibility of "take-home" yields that are
See Lawrence H. Seltzer, with the assistance of Selma F. Goldsmith and M. Slade Kendrick,
The Nature and Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and Loaaee(NationalBureau of Economic Research,
1951), Chaps. 1 and 10.INTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1307
substantially larger than those obtainable in the form of current in-
come from either safe or risky investments. The combination of high
tax rates on ordinary income and low ones on capital gains therefore
tends to discourage some forms of risky investment and to encourage
others.27
A study by Butters, Thompson, and Bollinger, based upon interviews
with several hundred active investors representing various levels of
income and wealth, presents evidence that although the investment
decisions of a majority of the investors interviewed were not signifi-
cantly influenced by taxes, the tax structure decreased the willingness
of the interviewed investors in the aggregate to make equity-type in-
vestments; that of the investors who were influenced, a greater number
were moved by tax considerations to more conservative than to more
venturesome investments; that a significant proportion of the investors
in the highest income groups were moved to shift to more venturesome
investments in an effort to obtain the preferential tax treatment af-
forded capital gains; and that the ability and disposition of the upper-
most income groups to supply equity capital remained strong in the
face of high taxes.28
When yields on common stocks fail to move in the same direction as
yields on high-grade bonds, a part of the explanation is doubtless to
be sought in the changing prospects for capital gains. When these pros-
pects include severe uncertainties or a deteriorating business outlook,
high or rising stock yields may persist in the face of low or declining
interest rates, as in most of the period between 1929 and 1949. The
opposite movements may occur when these prospects are regarded more
favorably by investors, as was presumably the case during the rise in
stock prices and decline in stock yields in the face of firming interest
rates in
Among the nontax influences (or those indirectly connected with
taxation) that may well have contributed to the exceptionally wide and
generally increasing spread between stock and bond yields after 1936
were the continuing strong growth in the resources of banks and other
institutional investors and the concentration of their investment de-
mand upon fixed-interest obligations. The investments of commercial
banks, savings banks, life insurance companies, and other financial
institutions are largely restricted by law, tradition, and prudential con-
siderations to high-grade bonds and mortgages. Net additions to the
27Ibid., Chaps.6 and 7; and J. Keith Butters, Laurence E. Thompson, and Lynn N. Bollinger,
Effects of Taxation: by Indi,yidiwla (Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard
University, 1953).
28Butters,Thompson, and Bollinger, op. cit.1308 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
supply of these, except for government obligations, were small or
negative during the 1930's and the first half of the 1940's. On the
other hand, the funds available for investment by financial institutions
increased enormously.
Commercial banks became insistent and large-scale bidders for
government and other high-grade securities. Their reserves were swelled
through huge gold imports in the 1930's and through large purchases
of government securities by the Federal Reserve Banks during the
1940's. Yet the total loans of all commercial banks in the United States
amounted to less at the end of 1945 than at the end of 1929 or even
1924. At the end of 1929 their loans had amounted to about three times
their holdings of all kinds of securities; at the end of 1945 their total
loans amounted to only about one-fourth of their holdings of securities.
With the loan demand restricted and new issues of high-grade corporate
and state and municipal bonds small, the banks had no major alterna-
tive outlet for their greatly enlarged funds other than federal govern-
ment securities during the 1930's and early 1940's. Their holdings of
these rose from $5 billion in 1929 to $91 billion in 1945, when they
accounted for about three-fourths of the total earning assets of com-
mercial banks. During the several years following 1945, when the
demand for business and mortgage loans rose greatly, the banks were
enabled to obtain additional reserves to meet this demand by selling
federal securities at more or less pegged prices to the Federal Reserve
System.
Similarly, the life insurance companies and other institutional in-
vestors were insistent bidders for government and other high-grade
obligations during the later 1930's and most of the 1940's because of
their rapidly growing resources and the small volume of alternative
investment opportunities. The 49 life insurance companies reporting
to the Life Insurance Association of America increased their total
admitted assets from $21.4 to $43.3 billion between 1935 and 1946.
Of the $21.9 billion increase, added holdings of United States govern-
ment securities accounted for $17.2 bfflion and public utility bonds for
$3.2 billion.
For banks, insurance companies, and other financial intermediaries,
the bulk of the funds that poured in each business day had to be in-
vested fairly promptly in high-grade fixed-interest obligations at
whatever yields were obtainable, with little regard to the higher yields
offered by common stocks and other equity investments. The down-
ward pressure upon the yields of high-grade fixed-interest securities
therefore became especially severe. Since individuals apparently alsoINTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1309
favored fixed-interest obligations during this period, partly for various
reasons suggested above, the exceptionally wide spread between bond
and stock yields appears less surprising than at first.
V. FUTURE TRENDS IN PERSONAL INTEREST INCOME
A comprehensive analysis of probable future trends in personal in-
terest income would involve detailed consideration of a large number of
complex influences. In an immediate sense the amount of direct per-
sonal interest income will be determined, of course, by the volume of
public and private debt held by individuals and the level and move-
ment of interest rates. But a host of intricate and interacting causal
forces will be operating behind these immediate determinants.
The amount of public debt available for private investment, for
example, will be determined partly by unpredictable events, such as
war and business depression, and partly by deliberate decisions, to be
made from year to year, with respect to the level of federal, state, and
local government expenditures, the extent to which the latter are to
be financed by borrowing rather than current taxation, and the pro-
vision for retiring or otherwise removing debt from the investment
markets—including such quasi retirements as the important amounts
acquired each year by the social security and other governmental
trust funds.
Changes in the volume of private debt will be influenced by all the
varied forces that determine the amount of private new capital forma-
tion. These include the actual and expected state of business, the
demands upon the physical capacity of public utility and other im-
portant capital-using industries, the degree to which important tech-
nological changes occur that create opportunities for profitable large-
scale investment, the amount of residential construction made profit-
able by population growth, geographical shifts in population, obsoles-
cence, and the terms of mortgage financing, etc.
But the extent to which private new capital formation will lead to
growth in private debt will in turn depend upon still other factors.
These include, among others, the volume of funds becoming available
for investment to financial institutions through net receipts from in-
dividuals, the amounts becoming available to business corporations
each year from retained earnings and depreciation charges, and the
relative popularity of bonds and mortgages as against common and
preferred stocks among investors.
Of the total amount of public and private debt made available for
investment, the amounts to be held directly by individuals will be